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Introduction
This study examines the association between Big 4 affiliated auditors and accruals quality in Bangladesh. Prior research shows that earnings of Big 4 clients are of higher quality than nonBig 4 clients (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Francis, 2004) with the gap in earnings quality widening with variations in investor protection (Francis and Wang, 2008) . The Big 4 international audit firms tend to operate in smaller capital markets through a local audit firm and Bangladesh is one such setting where this unique alliance occurs. (1998, 2006) measures of investor protection tend to be mature and larger economies. Smaller and emerging economies that relatively recently adopted regulations towards better investor protection have not been widely studied. The authors study Bangladesh because it (i) is an emerging economy whose capital market has undergone significant regulatory reforms, (ii) is one of the unique regimes where the Big 4 operates through a local audit firm, (iii) is not represented in the La Porta et al. (1998, 2006) measures of investor protection, and (iv) has an institutional environment that differs from the U.S. and such differences have implications for audit quality.
Accruals quality may become increasingly important to capital market participants in Bangladesh. Francis et al. (2004) find that accruals quality has cost of capital consequences.
Bangladeshi companies have normally relied heavily on bank financing. Companies are now increasingly turning to the stock market for financing. For example, the number of listed companies in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) increased from 192 in 1995 -96 to 259 in 2003 -04 (Bangladesh Bank, 2010 . The stock market is also attracting more investors than ever before.
For example, turnover in the DSE increased from BDT 8199.10 million in 1995-96 to BDT 24770.00 million in 2003 -04 (Bangladesh Bank, 2010 2 .
The market capitalization of companies listed with DSE increased from BDT 79361.7 million at the end of 1995-96 to BDT 141851.00 million at the end of 2003 -04 (Bangladesh Bank, 2010 . Thus given the increasing importance of the stock market to both companies and investors, accruals quality may be increasing in importance to companies, investors and regulators in Bangladesh.
To enhance the reputation of its capital market, Bangladesh attracted the international affiliated with a Big 4 are not subject to periodic reviews by any entity or regulator. Therefore, one expectation is that clients of a Big 4 affiliate would exhibit higher accruals quality than clients of local auditors.
However, there may be no difference in accruals quality between clients of affiliated Big 4 and other auditors in Bangladesh because her institutional environment appears to offer low investor protection for the following reasons. First, the World Bank (2003) reported that the external audit provides poor quality audits in Bangladesh because of poor regulatory oversight.
Second, the concentration of ownership in founders, families and closely related parties diminishes the demand for a high quality audit and increases the scope for expropriation of minority shareholders. 4 The appointment of an external auditor to opine on the annual financial statements may be a compliance exercise rather than an audit of substance. Third, the appointment of a Big 4 affiliate may be for impression management purposes; portraying an image to the market about the quality of the firm's earnings. Related is the plausibility that the local audit firm seeks out an affiliation to enhance its reputation and thereby impresses and gains potential new clients in the small and competitive audit market. Such impression management techniques usually are devoid of leading to higher accruals quality (e.g., Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007) . Fourth, the heightened potential for agency problems has not been effectively addressed by the recently adopted Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2006) corporate governance requirements. The Bangladesh SEC requires only one independent director on the board of a listed company which is in stark contrast to majority board independence requirements in other countries. As there is no prior Bangladesh evidence on the association between Big 4 affiliation and accruals quality, it is an open empirical question that this paper addresses.
Francis (2004) reviews the U.S. evidence on audit quality and notes that it is not clear whether the U.S. evidence on audit quality generalizes to audits in other countries. Audit quality is influenced by auditor incentives, which are, in turn, affected by the institutional environments (e.g., litigation risk exposure, monitoring and enforcement regimes) in which auditors work (Francis, 2004; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Venkataraman et al., 2008) . Since variation in institutional environments exists, a strong case exists for investigating the association between audit quality and accruals quality in different institutional environments. As noted earlier, the accounting and auditing environment in Bangladesh is distinctively different from that of the U.S. Thus, this study adds to the literature on audit quality and accruals quality by responding to calls for more international research on auditing practices by Francis (2004) .
The authors use both absolute discretionary accruals and signed discretionary accruals as measures of accruals quality. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the Bangladesh audit environment and the Section 3 discusses measures of accruals quality. The authors then explain the research method followed by the results in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Bangladesh audit environment and accruals quality
The Bangladesh SEC was established in 1993 to protect capital market participants, oversee issuance of securities and develop and regulate the Bangladesh securities market. The SEC has the authority to impose penalties on companies issuing misleading information and not complying with the legal corporate accounting and disclosure requirements. greater economic incentives to acquiesce with client reporting practices. Since the enforcement of regulations is weak and the market for audit services is spread thinly, the cost of breaching independence and not protecting their reputation may be lower than the economic benefits extracted from client fee revenues.
Overall, the nature of the institutional environment and the lack of effective audit regulation, together with the small and intensely competitive audit market raise interesting implications for the association between Big 4 affiliates and accruals quality in Bangladesh.
Prior research predominantly in the U.S. reports that the accruals quality of non-Big 4 clients is lower than that of Big 4 clients (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Krishnan, 2003) .
In addition, in a high investor protection market like the U.S., Big 4 audit firms have incentives to provide high quality audits (Francis and Wang, 2008) . Discovery of an audit failure leads to litigation, loss of reputation and future client revenues (DeAngelo, 1981; Krishnan, 2003) .
In Bangladesh and based on U.S. evidence, it may be expected that Big 4 affiliated audit firms will provide high quality audits which manifests in observable differences in accruals quality between Big 4 affiliates and local audit firms. This is so because there is some However, given the nature of the weak regulatory and investor protection regime in Bangladesh, it is plausible that Big 4 affiliates and local firms face the same set of incentives and thus they may not provide quality differentiated audits. To attract investors, obtain less costly finance and comply with the Bangladesh public company requirements, clients may hire Big 4 affiliated auditors for impression management purposes. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) document that firms engage in impression management to achieve some ulterior objective such as attempting to conceal or divert attention away from the quality of their reports and earnings.
Moreover, local auditors may also seek to form an alliance with a Big 4 firm for impression management purposes. If this is the case, then a Big 4 affiliate can market itself as a higher quality auditor and charge fee premiums but in fact provide audits that parallel the quality of local audit firms. Given the alternative arguments, this paper does not predict a directional association between Big 4 affiliates and accruals quality in Bangladesh.
Accruals quality
The most direct manifestation of audit quality is the auditor opinion on financial statements (Francis, 2004) . This paper does not use auditor opinion as the outcome variable because qualified audit opinions are infrequent and adverse opinions are rare in Bangladesh. So following prior research (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Francis, 2004) changes in revenue to determine the non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals in the event period (Dechow et al. 1995) . Kothari et al. (2005) propose a performance-matched accruals models. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Subramanyam (1996) There is no conclusive evidence on which accruals model best measures accruals quality (Gul et al., 2009 Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Krishnan, 2003) , this study uses both absolute discretionary accruals (|DACC|) and signed discretionary accruals (DACC) as measures of accruals quality. Absolute discretionary accruals and signed discretionary accruals are measured as absolute and signed residuals, respectively, from model (1). Absolute discretionary accruals treat both income-decreasing and incomeincreasing accruals symmetrically, and higher absolute discretionary accruals indicate poor earnings quality (Gul et al., 2009 ). On the other hand, when signed discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for accruals quality, positive discretionary accruals indicate management uses accruals to increase reported profit and hence, poor accruals quality. The interpretation of negative discretionary accruals is not straightforward, however. Since negative discretionary accruals indicate income-decreasing accruals, it is consistent with conservatism and higher accruals quality. At the same time, it is consistent with big bath behavior also (Gul et al., 2009 ).
Methodology

Data and sample
The After excluding outliers at the 1% and 99% levels, the authors have a final sample of 382 firmyears.
To address the representativeness of the sample, it is compared to the BASA population. Table I shows that the industry distribution of the sample is consistent with the industry distribution of the BASA population. About 78% of the sample comprises the textile, food, engineering and pharmaceuticals and chemical industries. 14 The study controls for absolute value of total accruals scaled by average total assets (|TACC_ATA|) because prior research (e.g., Becker et al., 1998) reports this variable affects accruals quality. This paper controls for leverage (TL_TA) and auditor change (AUDCHANGE) because prior research finds these associated with accruals quality (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Press and Weintrop, 1990; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994) . Models (2) and (3) include industry fixed effects (INDUSTRY) because (a) in the sample, clients of Big 4 affiliates and local auditors do not appear to be randomly distributed across industries and (b) accruals quality is not computed on an industry basis. Finally, this paper controls for year fixed effects because it uses a pooled cross-sectional sample and accruals quality may vary over time. (Gujarati, 2003) .
Results
Descriptive statistics
INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE
DD ( Panel B of Table IV shows that the coefficients on NEGNI, |TACC_ATA|, TL_TA and AUDCHANGE are statistically significant in both models (2) and (3). These observations are consistent with the prior accruals literature. More importantly, the coefficient on BFA is positive and significant (p<0.01) when |DACC| is the dependent variable, thus suggesting that clients of Big 4 affiliates have higher absolute accruals estimation errors relative to local audit firm clients.
Big 4 affiliates and accrual estimation error
The overall model is significant (p<0.01) with comparatively good explanatory power (adjusted-R 2 = 0.37). When DACC is the dependent variable, BFA is positive and significant (p<0.05),
suggesting that clients of Big 4 affiliates have higher income-increasing accruals than clients of local auditors.
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE
Additional analyses
Accruals quality is subject to measurement error. To enhance the robustness of the results, the authors estimated accruals quality using alternative accruals models and re-estimated models (2) and (3). The results are reported in Table V (2) and (3) are re-estimated using absolute and signed residuals from that model as proxies for accruals quality. The results are reported in second and third columns of Thus, while the results on the association between Big 4 affiliates and absolute discretionary accruals are robust to alternative accruals models, the results on the association between Big 4
affiliates and signed discretionary accruals depend on accruals models used. Collectively, these findings potentially suggest that the Big 4 affiliates do not have a positive impact on the accruals quality of their clients in Bangladesh.
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE
It is possible that self-selection bias affects the findings. Prior research documents that clients self-select auditors (Chaney et al., 2004) . Descriptive statistics in Table II suggest self-selection bias. Clients of Big4 affiliates report losses less frequently, are larger and more profitable than clients of local auditors. To control for possible endogeneity, this paper employs two-stage least squares regressions (2SLS) approach. In the first stage, the predicted value of BFA is obtained, which is then used in the second stage regression. Specifically, following Chaney et al. (2004) , the authors run the following auditor choice model and replace BFA in models (2) and (3) The results of 2SLS regressions are reported in Table VI . When model (2) is re-estimated using 2SLS approach, the overall model is significant (p<0.01) and BFA is positive and significant (p<0.01). BFA is positive and significant (p<0.01) when model (3) is re-estimated using 2SLS approach. Thus, the results hold good when self-selection bias is controlled for.
INSERT TABLE VI ABOUT HERE
Conclusion
This study investigates the association between Big 4 affiliates and accruals quality in affiliates and absolute discretionary accruals hold good across alternative accruals models and when self-selection bias is controlled for. However, the results on the association between Big 4 affiliates and signed discretionary accruals depend on accruals models used. Thus, the association between Big 4 affiliates and accruals quality in Bangladesh depends on measures of accruals quality and accruals models used. Collectively, these findings potentially suggest that the Big 4 affiliates do not have a positive impact on the accruals quality of their clients compared to local audit firms not affiliated with a Big 4 auditor in Bangladesh.
The findings differ from those in the U.S. (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999) but are broadly consistent with Francis and Wang (2008) . Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999) find that Big 4 clients have lower discretionary accruals (higher accruals quality) than their non-Big 4 counterparts. Francis and Wang (2008) find that the Big 4 are positively associated with accruals quality in strong investor protection regimes but negatively associated in weaker regimes. The Bangladesh audit environment is characterized by an intensely competitive market for audit services, poor demand for quality audit services, and poor monitoring and enforcement regime. Thus, although Big 4 affiliates may be monitored by their respective international Big 4, the results suggest such monitoring may not manifest in the measures of accruals quality the paper examines.
A potential explanation of the findings of this study is that clients hire a Big 4 affiliated auditor to convey the impression that their earnings is of high quality than clients audited by local auditors, when in fact that may not be the case. Because larger firms are more visible to the market, and firms with greater resources including better profits and cash flow can afford to pay audit fee premiums to a Big 4 affiliate, such firms may be hiring a Big 4 affiliate for impression management purposes (e.g., Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007) . The univariate audit fee tests and multivariate accruals quality tests are consistent with this explanation. The authors observed that Big 4 affiliates charged significantly higher audit fees than non-Big 4 local firms. The audit fee difference was more than 400%. Also, local audit firms may seek out an affiliation with an international Big 4 firm to give the impression they are of higher quality than local auditors unaffiliated with a Big 4. Thus, Big 4 affiliates could justify charging audit fee premiums. Such conjecture is consistent with the concept of impression management (e.g., Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007) . To provide further insight to the proposition, this study calls for further research examining why firms appoint a Big 4 affiliate, and whether firms switch from a local audit firm to a Big 4 affiliate. The descriptive data in Table II This study is subject to the following caveats. First, it is widely recognized that any proxy for accruals quality is not error free. Although the study employs primary and additional measures to enhance the reliability of the results, the authors acknowledge the noise in the proxies for accruals quality may affect the results. Although the authors considered using audit opinions as a proxy for audit quality, it was discovered that the variation in audit opinions was negligible thus limiting its use as a dependent variable. Most audit opinions were clean opinions. BDT 68.80 during 2008 -09 (Bangladesh Bank, 2010 . This development in Bangladesh stock market will likely increase the importance of accruals quality of listed firms in Bangladesh. Barring these changes, the authors are not aware of any other major change in the Bangladesh accounting and audit environment. Thus, while the data are somewhat dated, the data and findings of this study are very relevant even today. the residual from model (1) DACC = the signed residual from model (1) AUDSIZE = the number of sample companies audited by the auditor in a given year; NEGNI = 1 if the sample firm has net loss in the fiscal year, 0 otherwise; |TACC_ATA| = the absolute magnitude of total accruals scaled by average total assets; LOGTA = the natural logarithm of total assets; TL_TA = total liabilities divided by total assets; OC = the length of operating cycle measured as (average days in inventories + average days in receivables)/365; AUDCHANGE = 1 if there is an auditor change, 0 otherwise; GROWTH = the percentage change in sales; NI_ATA = net income deflated by average of total assets; and CFO_ATA = cash flow scaled by average total assets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. # The Mann-Whitney test yields similar results. White's (1980) corrected standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table IV
Results of accruals quality analysis All variables are defined in Table II . The reported t-values are based on White's (1980) corrected standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
